Executive Summary
The human rights situation in West Papua[1] throughout 2025 reveals a critical pivot point in the decades-long conflict between the Indonesian state and the indigenous Papuan population. While certain systemic patterns, such as the architecture of legal impunity and the suppression of peaceful political dissent, remain stagnant, 2025 has introduced a series of aggressive new patterns that represent a significant departure from the dynamics of 2024 and previous years. Case documentation by local human rights groups and independent activists indicates that the situation has transitioned from a localised highland insurgency into an extensive and modern tactics warfare across the central highlands.
Military members are pushing into remote areas, establishing military outposts in indigenous villages to gain control over remote areas. Military operations in these areas have been characterised by the use of anti-personnel landmines or booby traps and aerial warfare technologies, including weaponised drones and fighter planes. The massive structural expansion of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) under the administration of President Prabowo Subianto opened new frontiers for systematic land grabbing in Merauke, Biak-Numfor, Intan Jaya, and other geographic areas of economic interest.
The data indicate that the primary drivers of conflict-related human rights violations are no longer immediate responses to armed resistance, but a coordinated effort to secure territory for resource extraction and economic development in West Papua. Indonesia’s new administration under President Prabowo Subianto has pursued a security-based approach, introducing plans for up to 500 new battalions to secure and implement infrastructure and agribusiness projects. This marks the most significant peacetime military expansion in Indonesia’s modern history. As the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continues to climb and the military presence keeps expanding, indigenous Papuans face an existential threat to their security, land and culture.
As of December 2025, over 105,000 people in West Papua were internally displaced, with most IDPs having not returned to their villages due to ongoing conflict or heavy military presence. The number of IDPs has risen from roughly 85,000 IDPs reported in 2024. The central government continues to deny the existence of conflict-driven internal displacement in West Papua, showing no signs of facilitating humanitarian access or withdrawal of security force personnel from the region. Many displaced families have lived in limbo since the armed conflict situation significantly deteriorated in December 2018, afraid to return to their militarised home areas. IDPs are sheltering in makeshift camps or remote forests with little to no aid, facing acute shortages of food, clean water, medicine, and shelter. Ongoing security operations impede humanitarian access to IDPs, whose vast majority consists of indigenous Papuans. They are disproportionately affected by these operations, which commonly target indigenous communities. Examples from Intan Jaya, Pegunungan Bintang, and other regencies illustrate that the increased presence of security personnel in previously unaffected areas fuels violence and suffering for the local civilian population, rather than establishing security and stability.
Extrajudicial killings, torture, and enforced disappearances persisted at alarming rates. Reported cases of torture and ill-treatment of Papuan civilians rose significantly in comparison to previous years. The year 2025 also saw a spike in the cases of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention, intimidation, and violations of the freedom of assembly. Civilians in conflict areas bear the risk of violence from both state and non-state actors, resulting in dozens of deaths, injuries, and at least 11 reported victims of enforced disappearance throughout the year. Like previous years, the militarisation of government administration under President Prabowo and the restriction of independent media impede the exposure of human rights violations to the Indonesian public and international community. Narratives about West Papua in the national media are often shaped by the military, which is often the only state institution present in conflict areas.
Freedom of expression and peaceful assembly continued to face heavy restrictions in 2025. Indonesian authorities cracked down on protests and political dissent in West Papua, often with arbitrary arrests and force. Journalists and human rights defenders also faced intimidation and violence, highlighted by the unresolved Molotov attack on the Papuan media outlet Jubi. A landmark Constitutional Court ruling in May 2025 offered a rare positive development. The constitutional court strengthened protections for free speech by barring government bodies and officials from using defamation laws to target critics.
Indigenous Papuans’ land rights and livelihoods came under increasing pressure in 2025. Government-driven natural resource projects accelerated without meaningful consent, leading to systematic indigenous rights violations. In the central highlands, military units occupied villages near the Wabu Block gold mining concession in Intan Jaya, prompting community mass protests. In the Papua Selatan Province, the Strategic National Project (PSN) in Merauke continued expansion. The massive agricultural project is implemented by military personnel without Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) of the indigenous Marind people. Likewise, in Papua Barat Daya Province, the Indigenous Moi Tribe struggled against new palm oil concessions that threaten West Papua’s last intact forests. Large-scale agricultural projects, timber logging, and mining operations have led to massive environmental destruction and the erosion of indigenous culture.
The accessibility, quality, and adequacy of healthcare and education services in West Papua are poor, ranking among the lowest in the country. There are no signs of improvement, especially in conflict-affected areas. Hundreds of villages in the highlands do not have access to functional schools or clinics because teachers and health workers fled ongoing violence. Even in urban areas, public services have reached alarming low levels. Major hospitals faced staff strikes and corruption scandals. These failures, alongside significant special autonomy funds ostensibly allocated to West Papua, underscore a persistent gap in basic services and government accountability.
The 2025 Annual Report is organised in two main parts, following the 2024 report structure. Section I covers Civil and Political Rights, examining patterns of impunity, violence, restrictions on fundamental freedoms, indigenous peoples’ rights, and social rights (health, education). Section II addresses Conflict and Displacement, detailing the armed conflict dynamics and the internal displacement crisis. Statistical tables are included below to summarise key trends.
[1] The term West Papua, also sometimes referred to as Papua, Tanah Papua (Land of Papua) or Western New Guinea refers to the western half of the New Guinea islands and is recognized by the United Nations as part of Indonesia since 1969. It is comprised of the Indonesian administrative provinces Papua Province, Papua Barat Province, Papua Tengah Province, Papua Pegunungan Province, Papua Selatan Province, and Papua Barat Daya Province.
Civil and Political Rights
Table 1: Statistical data on civil and political rights violations in West Papua (2020–2025)
| Data on civil and political rights (West Papua) Number of reported … | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
| Torture/ill-treatment cases* | 34 | N/A | 46 | 39 | 54 | 73 ↑ |
| Torture/ill-treatment victims* | 89 | 69 | 223 | 160+ | 166+ | 170+ |
| Cases of extra-judicial killings | 16 | N/A | 14 | 17 | 18 | 27 ↑ |
| Victims of extra-judicial killings | 25 | 17 | 18 | 42 | 21 | 48 ↑ |
| Cases of enforced disappearances | 2 | N/A | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Victims of enforced disappearances | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 11 ↑ |
| Sanctions against perpetrators (police/military) | 2 | N/A | 13 | 7 | 0 | 4 |
| Political arbitrary detentions | 384 | 585 | 492 | 311 | 396 | 214 |
| Peaceful demonstrations/assemblies forcefully dispersed * | 37 | N/A | 29 | 13 | 26 | 18 |
| Persons sentenced under treason laws (Art. 106/110 KUHP) | 18 | N/A | 15 | 10 | 4 | 4 |
Sources: Human Rights Monitor (HRM) database, compiled from local media, NGOs, and human rights defenders. *Figures include violations against indigenous Papuans and non-Papuan supporters outside West Papua. A “+” indicates additional unquantified victims (e.g. “dozens”) beyond the documented count
Impunity
Impunity for human rights violations remained widespread in 2025, with few perpetrators prosecuted despite numerous reported abuses. One notable exception occurred on 28 October 2025, when the Wamena District Court convicted four police officers for the fatal 2024 shooting of Mr Tobias Silak in Yahukimo. The primary defendant received 14 years in prison for murder, and three others received 5-year terms. The conviction marks a rare victory for accountability in West Papua. Similarly, a military tribunal in Jayapura in July 2025 found a Navy officer guilty of murdering a civilian woman, sentencing him to imprisonment. These cases are isolated exceptions. Security personnel implicated in killings, torture, and other violations were seldom brought to justice, perpetuating a cycle of abuse. Most incidents of security force violence still end with no punishment or only lenient penalties, sending a message that perpetrators will not be held accountable.
Many cases saw little to no legal progress, indicating systemic impunity. The Molotov attack on the Jubi news office (December 2022), for instance, remained unsolved after a year. Despite CCTV footage and witnesses, authorities have made no arrests or identified suspects. Likewise, investigations into allegations of torture by Sorong City police stagnated, with no suspects being named. Such examples illustrate a broader pattern. There has been no progress in the military investigation into the torture of three indigenous Papuans in the Omukia District after almost two years of waiting.
In response to official inaction, Papuan civil society and human rights defenders intensified efforts to press for accountability. In June 2025, a coalition of NGOs filed a formal complaint regarding the extra-judicial killing and mutilation of Mr Abral Wandikbo with the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the Military Police, and other bodies. This advocacy sought to trigger investigations at the national level, testing Indonesia’s commitment to uphold justice in West Papua. Church leaders and local NGOs regularly exposed human rights violations and urged prosecutions. The October 2025 convictions in the Silak case were a success of the advocacy campaign by the FJTS solidarity groups to draw persistent public attention to the trial and Judicial Commission monitoring of the trial after complaints of irregularities.
Killings, disappearances, and torture
The number of reported extrajudicial killings increased significantly in 2025 (see Table 1), with most victims being indigenous Papuans. Dozens of security operations in conflict areas were conducted with lethal force against indigenous civilians. For example, during a large military raid in Intan Jaya in May 2025, troops allegedly killed and “disappeared” around a dozen indigenous villagers in one operation. On 6 July 2025, a 25-year-old Papuan Villager was reportedly executed by security force members in Gilini Village during a military operation in Omukia District, Puncak Regency. TNI members allegedly attached an explosive device to the body and later placed it in an abandoned home in the Ilaga District, causing a detonation that incinerated both the body. The overall picture of such incidents reflects a pattern of excessive lethal force against unarmed indigenous Papuans and disregard for the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants, resulting in avoidable civilian deaths.
Indonesian security forces increasingly employed heavy weaponry and indiscriminate tactics in counterinsurgency operations. Throughout 2025, there were multiple reports of the TNI using aerial attacks in populated areas. Between March and early April 2025, the TNI launched a large-scale counterinsurgency operation in the Intan Jaya Regency, accompanied by heavy aerial bombardments using aircraft, helicopters, and combat drones. On 25 November 2025, an Indonesian military drone strike hit a civilian home in Intan Jaya, killing a 17-year-old high school student and injuring another civilian. A few weeks later in Yahukimo, a 40-year-old indigenous man was fatally wounded by a victim-activated explosive device planted on a footpath commonly used by villagers. Airstrikes, drone-fired munitions, and booby traps blur the line between combatants and non-combatants. Human rights observers noted that these indiscriminate attacks violate international humanitarian principles and directly contributed to the year’s high civilian death toll.
Acts of torture, ill-treatment, and inhumane punishment continued to be frequently reported in 2025, often in the context of security operations or arbitrary detentions. Police and military frequently tortured and ill-treated suspects and protesters suspected of supporting the political independence movement or its armed wing, the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB). Reports described suspects being beaten, kicked, burned with cigarettes, or threatened at gunpoint during interrogations. The first quarter of 2025 saw an unusually high number of torture cases, correlating with a wave of military raids in Puncak, Nduga, and Pegunungan Bintang. For instance, in March, reports from Puncak Jaya alleged soldiers of torturing five villagers, and in July, joint security force personnel arbitrarily detaining and torturing four political activists in Dekai, Yahukimo Regency. These and other incidents indicate that torture and ill-treatment remain part of a common tactic applied by state agents. The prevalence of such abuse is reflected in the statistical case data. HRM documented 73 cases of torture or ill-treatment across West Papua in 2025, affecting well over 170 victims (Table 1). This marks a significant increase in such violations in comparison to previous years, underscoring the urgent need for enforcement of anti-torture laws and independent monitoring of detention sites.
Freedom of expression
Law enforcement institutions persisted in using criminal charges to suppress political activists and government critics. In 2025, four Papuan activists were prosecuted or convicted under treason and criminal conspiracy statutes (Articles 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code KUHP) merely for peaceful political expression. In November 2025, the Makassar District Court (South Sulawesi) sentenced the four activists to seven months in prison. They had been arrested in Sorong for delivering letters to local government offices, calling upon President Prabowo Subianto to enter into peaceful negotiations on West Papuan self-determination. Despite procedural irregularities and mass protests in Sorong, the trial was moved 1,500 km from Sorong to Makassar, allegedly for security concerns. In addition, dozens of others faced charges for activism (see Table 1).
Papuans attempting to exercise their freedom of assembly in various towns across the region faced repression, often accompanied by excessive use of force during crowd control operations. Security forces prohibited or dispersed rallies on grounds of “separatism”, security, or lack of a police letter confirming that demonstrations were formally registered. Only a small number of public demonstrations on West Papua issues were allowed to proceed peacefully. For instance, Papuan students organising rallies in cities like Nabire and Jayapura to protest Freeport mining and militarisation in West Papua were met with preventive roadblocks and force on 7 April 2025. Police officers fired tear gas, beat protesters, and arbitrarily arrested participants in Nabire. Although the number of dispersed protests was smaller than in 2024, public space for Papuan aspirations remains extremely restricted. Organisers reported being arbitrarily detained or ill-treated, creating a climate of fear.
Journalists and human rights defenders in West Papua had to work under repressive circumstances, constantly facing the risk of violence and harassment by security force personnel. Security forces were the primary perpetrators of press freedom violations in 2024, a trend that persisted into 2025. The unsolved Molotov attack on the Jubi newspaper’s office in Jayapura exemplifies the hostile environment for the media. Human rights defenders (HRDs) also experiencedintimidation and violent assaults. Amnesty International’s Secretary General visited Indonesia in early 2025 and expressed concerns that activists face systematic criminalisation and intimidation by authorities for exposing abuses in West Papua. Despite these pressures, Papuan civil society remained resilient. Internationally, Papuan activists also sought to raise their voice, with representatives addressing a UN Human Rights Council side event in Geneva in September 2025 to highlight ongoing human rights grievances in West Papua.
A significant victory with regard to the freedom of expression in Indonesia came on 2 May 2025, when Indonesia’s Constitutional Court issued a ruling on the controversial Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law. The Court held that government bodies, companies, and officials can no longer file criminal defamation complaints under the ITE Law. The decision explicitly recognised that criticising government policies is a form of public oversight in a democracy and should not be criminalised.
Separately, in August 2025, President Prabowo granted clemency to six political prisoners from West Papua ahead of Indonesia’s Independence Day. Most of them were jailed for peaceful protest or expressing pro-independence sentiment. While the release of these prisoners was positive, observers noted it was largely symbolic, as most of them had served most of their sentence by that time, being released on parole anyway. In fact, the overall legal and political context remained repressive for Papuans voicing dissent.
Indigenous peoples
The Indonesian state’s policies in 2025 further eroded indigenous Papuans’ control over their ancestral lands. By dividing West Papua into smaller, more manageable administrative units, the government has facilitated the proliferation of new military commands (Kodim), naval bases, and police posts (Polres). This bureaucratic expansion creates an infrastructure for surveillance that reaches into the most remote districts, effectively turning civilian administration into an extension of the security apparatus. Under the guise of national development and security, authorities expanded military presence into remote indigenous territories without local consent. New army battalions and posts were established in highland regencies like Intan Jaya, Puncak, and Pegunungan Bintang, often occupying communal land, village centres and churches. In one striking example, 23 new military outposts were built across Intan Jaya alone by late 2025.
Some of these deployments have been justified as “territorial development,” but indigenous communities report feeling under siege. Soldiers frequently intimidated villagers and conducted raids that disrupted daily life, particularly in conflict-affected areas. The Papuans of Silatuga village in Intan Jaya staged protests against the military occupation of their land, expressing concern that the construction serves the purpose of securing a potential mining site. Overall, 2025 saw increased militarisation of civilian spaces, from villages to local administrations, diluting indigenous peoples’ authority over their own lands and heightening tensions.
Extraction projects in West Papua accelerated, often violating indigenous rights and causing deforestation. The government pushed ahead with strategic projects that open huge areas to mining, logging, and agribusiness. One of the most alarming is the Strategic National Project in Merauke, South Papua Province, aiming to convert at least 1.6–2 million hectares of land into commercial plantations. This land is predominantly owned by the indigenous Marind Anim and few other tribes. In 2025, military-backed companies began clearing forests for this project without free, prior, informed consent (FPIC) of indigenous land rights holders. The expansion also led to massive deforestation and loss of livelihood for local communities. On 19 August 2025, eight civil society organisations and twelve victims of National Strategic Projects (PSN) filed a judicial review petition at Indonesia’s Constitutional Court, challenging key provisions of the Job Creation Law (Law No. 6/ 2023) that legitimise facilitation and acceleration of PSN projects at the expense of constitutional rights and environmental protection. On 16 December 2025, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto announced plans to expand palm oil plantations across West Papua as part of a broader strategy to achieve energy self-sufficiency within five years. Indigenous communities responded with open letters and peaceful protests. Marind Anim representatives and dozens of indigenous people, calling for its cancellation in defence of their land and culture.
Similarly, in Papua Barat Daya, the government’s plan for a massive palm oil project spurred the Indigenous Moi people of Sorong and others to file legal challenges and public petitions in mid-2025. These communities understand the project as an “existential threat” to their last remaining rainforests, areas of profound ecological and cultural value. Environmental defenders documented an “unprecedented scale” of deforestation across West Papua in 2024–2025, with nearly a quarter of forest loss attributed to national strategic projects. The nickel mining boom in Raja Ampat is one such crisis, where multiple mines operated without proper safeguards, polluting rivers and sacred sites. Indigenous communities in West Papua find themselves cornered by state-backed economic interests, resulting in environmental destruction and the undermining of traditional livelihoods.
The year 2025 also underscored the cultural challenges and racial discrimination faced by Papuans. Indonesian authorities continued policies of demographic change and cultural assimilation that marginalise indigenous Papuans. Uncontrolled spontaneous migration of non-Papuans, encouraged by infrastructure projects, has contributed to social tensions. In mid-2025, ethnic violence erupted in Dogiyai after a traffic incident, leading to communal clashes between Papuans and non-Papuans. A similar outbreak in Yalimo highlighted rising horizontal conflicts fuelled by grievances over uncontrolled migration, economic marginalisation, and discrimination. Papuan students across Indonesian cities reported an intimidation campaign between April and July 2025, where authorities and nationalist groups harassed students at dormitories and campuses. The Indonesian state’s failure to address such acts leaves many Papuans feeling like second-class citizens.
West Papua’s indigenous rights crisis gained some international visibility in 2025. At the UN Human Rights Council in September, the World Council of Churches hosted a panel highlighting the concerning trends under Prabowo’s development policies. Days later, a statement by Christian Solidarity International urged the UN’s Indigenous Peoples mechanism to investigate the marginalisation of Indigenous Papuans, citing the national strategic projects as a key danger. In the Pacific region, leaders continued to voice concern. The Pacific Islands Forum in November 2025 reiterated calls for an independent human rights mission to West Papua.
Health
Official health data indicate a pattern of structural neglect and inequality in the realisation of health rights in West Papua. Despite the construction of new health facilities and increased funding, health outcomes remain far below national standards, disproportionately affecting indigenous Papuans. The situation points to failures to ensure availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of healthcare services as required under international human rights law.
West Papua’s health crisis in 2025 underscored long-standing structural problems. The situation in the Papuan provinces reflects some of the most severe inequalities in Indonesia and raises serious concerns regarding the fulfilment of the right to health. Life expectancy at birth in all Papuan provinces is substantially below the national average, with gaps of four to seven years. As of 2024, Papua Pegunungan, Papua Selatan and Papua Tengah were among the provinces with the lowest life expectancy nationwide. These disparities point to underlying issues in nutrition, maternal health, and healthcare access that implicate the right to health of Papuan people.
Limited healthcare infrastructure remains a structural driver of poor outcomes. Many villages across West Papua lack health facilities, and where facilities exist, they are often understaffed, under-equipped, and difficult to reach due to geography. The number of hospitals and community health centres is disproportionately low relative to population size and territorial challenges. Although government statistics indicate that universal enrolment in the National Health Insurance scheme (JKN) has been nearly achieved, insurance coverage has not translated into effective access to care, as physical availability and quality of services remain severely constrained.
Maternal health indicators illustrate acute rights deficits. In several Papuan provinces, a significant proportion of births are not attended by trained health personnel and do not take place in health facilities. In some highland and remote areas, skilled birth attendance rates fall far below national averages, contributing directly to high maternal mortality. Cultural practices, combined with difficult access to functional facilities and a lack of trust in health services, further reduce institutional deliveries. Lately published government statistics show that none of the Papuan provinces had built maternity hospitals as of 2024, despite available Special Autonomy Funds for the improvement of health services. These conditions undermine women’s rights to health, life, and non-discrimination, particularly for indigenous Papuan women.
Child health outcomes are similarly alarming. Immunisation coverage among children aged 12–23 months in the Papuan provinces is among the lowest in Indonesia, with the Papua Pegunungan Province reporting full immunisation rates below 20 per cent. This leaves most children exposed to preventable diseases and reflects systemic failures in outreach, service delivery, and continuity of care. The persistent immunisation gap highlights unequal access to basic preventive health services.
The ongoing conflict and militarisation in West Papua had devastating impacts on healthcare access in 2025. As military operations expanded, many health facilities in the highland conflict zones ceased functioning. In Intan Jaya, one of the most affected regencies, 6 clinics and health posts were abandoned or shut down as medical staff fled armed violence. Vaccination programs and maternal health services in these areas stopped. Local sources reported that in some districts, such as Sugapa, Intan Jaya, almost all doctors or nurses had left by the end of 2025, forcing villagers to travel for days on foot to seek basic treatment.
Health services in conflict zones have been largely handed over to the military. Indigenous Papuans are reluctant to visit the few operational clinics because they are often guarded or monitored by state security forces. Military members patrol through villages offering basic medical treatment at home, an approach that is by far not sufficient to replace medically equipped health centres run by professional health personnel. Indigenous Papuans have been protesting the growing militarisation. This militarisation of health services deterred the sick and injured from seeking care, compounding the health crisis. Displaced populations hiding in forests received no medical aid or humanitarian access, causing the rate of preventable deaths among IDPs in conflict areas to rise.
Urban and regional healthcare facilities in West Papua also faced systemic challenges in 2025. Despite significant special autonomy funds allocated to health, many hospitals suffered from mismanagement and shortages, giving rise tocorruption and neglect. An audit at Nabire Regional Hospital uncovered IDR 10 billion (about € 500,900) in missing funds, which were meant for health worker incentives. This scandal led to the strike by over 200 staff at the hospital in early 2025, protesting months of unpaid benefits. Services were paralysed during the strike, affecting thousands of patients.
Alarming reports of medical malpractice emerged and caught public attention after the incidents reached local media. A patient in Serui Hospital in Yapen Island reportedly died due to a lack of oxygen and proper care, sparking local outrage. Similar incidents were reported from the regencies Jayapura and Maybrat. Two health cases of September and November 2025 revealed that even in West Papua’s largest city, Jayapura, hospitals face a shortage of doctors and specialists. Patients facing serious injuries or medical emergencies were rejected and asked to seek medical aid in another hospital. These incidents should not be understood as isolated cases, but as part of a systematic pattern of government negligence in the health sector.
Education
The Special Autonomy funds, which include an earmark for education, have not translated into significant improvements by 2025. Education indicators across the Papuan provinces reveal persistent structural inequality when compared with national averages. Statistical data points to systemic barriers rather than isolated shortcomings. The most striking disparities appear in average years of schooling, which fall dramatically in the highland provinces. While Indonesia averages roughly nine years of education, Papua Tengah and Papua Pegunungan provinces remain several years behind, signalling that large segments of the population do not complete basic education.
Literacy rates further demonstrate the depth of exclusion. The data compiled by the government may be helpful to gain a gross impression of the situation in the field, which is likely worse than reflected in the government statistics. Although some Papuan provinces report literacy levels close to the national average, the Papua Tengah province and particularly the Papua Pegunungan province show significantly lower literacy among working-age adults. Such gaps are typically associated with long-term barriers to school access, including geographic isolation, limited infrastructure, teacher shortages, and poverty. Literacy disparities of this scale suggest unequal enjoyment of the right to education and raise concerns about indirect discrimination affecting rural and indigenous populations.
Statistical data on school participation indicates that the education system in the Papuan provinces loses students as they grow older. Participation is comparatively strong at the primary level but declines sharply at the upper-secondary level, with some Papuan provinces recording dramatically lower attendance than the national average. The statistics suggest that children may enter school but are often unable to proceed beyond the completion of compulsory education. Likely drivers include long travel distances to secondary schools, security concerns, economic pressures, early marriage, and limited availability of qualified teachers.
The armed conflict continued to have a devastating effect on the education system in large parts of West Papua. In 2025, dozens of schools remained closed or abandoned due to insecurity. Teachers, many of whom are non-local, have fled many highland districts, and the government has not provided replacements. Intan Jaya exemplifies this crisis. By late 2025, 52 out of 59 schools in Intan Jaya Regency were reportedly non-functional because of recurring armed clashes and security force raids that forced teachers and the local population to flee.
Similarly, in parts of other conflict-affected regencies such as Puncak, Nduga, Yahukimo, and Pegunungan Bintang, primary and secondary schools could not operate efficiently as communities were displaced or parents were too fearful to send their children to school. Based on data of internally displaced persons in West Papua as of January 2026, HRM estimates that several thousand Papuan children in conflict-affected areas have missed years of schooling. Entire generations in certain villages are growing up without basic education, a long-term impact of the conflict that will be hard to reverse.
West Papua continued to suffer a chronic shortage of teachers, exacerbated by the region’s instability. The government’s response of deploying military personnel to fill civilian roles extended into education in 2025. In some isolated areas where no teachers remained, military officers tried to organise ad-hoc teaching programs, but this approach has been controversial. Indigenous leaders argue that armed soldiers in classrooms further intimidate children and the communities, rather than providing quality education. In January 2026, a Papuan senator publicly urged the government to build schools instead of military bases, highlighting that budgets were being poured into security rather than education. Unfortunately, there was little indication that this plea would be considered by the Government.
Conflict and displacement
Armed conflict
The armed conflict between Indonesian security forces (TNI/police) and the TPNPB escalated further in 2025, reaching its highest levels of violence in recent years. HRM documented 141 armed clashes and attacks throughout the year, slightly exceeding the record set in 2024. Particularly from August onwards, there was a notable uptick in military operations coinciding with Prabowo’s military expansion policies. Clashes spread across 16 regencies across the Papuan provinces. The epicentres of armed conflict in 2025 were the regencies Yahukimo (35 clashes) and Intan Jaya (31clashes). The regencies Puncak (23 clashes), Pegunungan Bintang (10 clashes), and Dogiyai (7 clashes), Puncak Jaya (6 clashes), Teluk Bintuni (5 clashes) and Mimika (5 clashes) experienced lower levels of re-occurring armed violence.
Significantly, some areas that had been relatively calm saw new violence. For instance, isolated incidents were reported in Teluk Bintuni and Maybrat (in the western Bird’s Head region), indicating the geographical spread of conflict. In contrast, armed clashes in the Nduga regency have declined sharply from 17 clashes documented in 2024 to only 4 documented clashes in 2025. By the end of 2025, both local observers and church leaders described West Papua as “highly militarised”, with soldiers patrolling many rural areas and conducting operations.
The Indonesian government’s strategy in West Papua remained centred on force. In August 2025, Finance Minister Sri Mulyani announced plans to form 500 new military battalions nationwide, many of which would be stationed in West Papua. This represents the largest peacetime military expansion in decades and a continuation of militarised conflict management. Throughout 2025, new “territorial battalions” (special units for civic action but effectively troops on the ground) were established in areas like Biak, Supiori, and Waropen. The TNI also built or upgraded numerous posts closer to where indigenous communities live, sometimes under the pretext of guarding development projects or protecting civilians from armed threats.
Security force raids in 2025 involved sophisticated military equipment. Human rights observers documented the use of spy and battle drones, aerial bombardments from various types of aircraft, as well as anti-personnel landmines or booby traps. The use of these devices has a significant impact on the civilian population, who often get caught in the crossfire during security raids and armed clashes with the TPNPB. Accordingly, conflict-related civilian casualties increased from 43 in 2022 to 63 in 2023. The figure decreased to 44 in 2024 but has risen again to 73 in 2025. Raid tactics involved deliberate destruction of houses and livestock. This persistent pattern appears to be a TNI strategy to disrupt guerrilla fighters’ local supply networks, contributing to the internal displacement of over 105,000 people by January 2026. Such raids demonstrate a systemic failure to adhere to the “principle of distinction” under international humanitarian law, which requires combatants to distinguish between legitimate military targets and civilians. The targeting of religious gatherings and IDP shelters indicates that the TNI has adopted a “total war” footing in its operations against the TPNPB, often viewing the civilian population as an extension of the armed resistance or as collateral damage in a broader effort to deny the TPNPB territorial access.
The armed hostilities in 2025 continued with violations of humanitarian law committed on both sides. Civilians were frequently caught in the crossfire or directly targeted. Indonesian forces conducted search-and-destroy operations that often involved burning homes and the occupation of public facilities. TNI members reportedly used prohibited indiscriminate combat tactics against civilians, involving anti-personnel land mines and bombardments of civilian areas. HRM received credible reports of extrajudicial executions during raids. The TPNPB, on the other hand, continued assassinations of individuals deemed collaborators: local officials, Indonesian migrant traders, and even medical workers came under attack (see section onkillings, disappearances, and torture).
TPNPB fighters attacked schools and other public facilities, killing mainly non-Papuans under suspicion of being affiliated with the intelligence or military. In April 2025, TPNPB fighters attacked a group of migrant gold miners in Yahukimo, allegedly killing 15 miners in one incident. Such incidents terrorise the broader civilian population and often prompt mass displacement. Casualty figures for 2025 reflect this heavy toll. Thirty-onecivilian deaths were attributable to security force raids or crossfire, and 42 civilian deaths resulted from TPNPB attacks. Dozens of civilians suffered injuries (See table 2 below for detailed conflict statistics). Both the Indonesian government and the TPNPB leadership issued statements blaming each other for endangering civilians; however, the collected data on armed violence suggests that both partiesbreached humanitarian norms in 2025, prolonging the suffering of civilians in West Papua.
Table 2: Armed conflict in West Papua (2018–2025)
| Armed violence in West Papua Number of … | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
| Armed attacks/incidents | 44 | 33 | 64 | 85 | 72 | 110 | 135 | 141 ↑ |
| Security forces (TNI/POLRI) killed | 8 | 18 | 11 | 18 | 19 | 57 | 33 | 38 |
| Security forces injured | 15 | 12 | 10 | 34 | 29 | 41 | 26 | 34 |
| TPNPB fighters killed | 12 | 14 | 14 | 24 | 8 | 18 | 21 | 29 ↑ |
| TPNPB fighters injured | 4 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 7 | 6 | 16 ↑ |
| Civilians killed during clashes/raids ¹ | 42 | 20 | 27 | 28 | 43 | 63 | 44 | 73↑ |
| – Killed by security forces | 17 | 13 | 20 | 12 | 5 | 23 | 21 | 31↑ |
| – Killed by TPNPB fighters | 25 | 7 | 7 | 14 | 38 | 40 | 23 | 42↑ |
| Civilians injured during clashes | 15 | 9 | 27 | 20 | 21 | 57 | 37 | 48 |
| – Injured by security forces | 7 | 9 | 10 | 7 | 2 | 23 | 21 | 27↑ |
| – Injured by TPNPB fighters | 8 | 0 | 16 | 13 | 19 | 34 | 16 | 21 |
¹Includes Papuan civilians killed in crossfire, during security raids, and targeted killings by either side. Sources: HRM documentation (media reports, TPNPB statements, human rights observers). 2025 figures are conservative estimates indicating a likely rise in overall violence and casualties compared to 2024.
While the central highlands remained the core conflict zone, 2025 saw fighting spill into new areas. HRM documented three armed clashes in Jayawijaya, a regency from which no armed clashes had been reported in previous years. Notably, the Bird’s Head region (Southwest Papua) continued to experience armed clashes in 2025 with sporadic violence in Maybrat and Teluk Bintuni regencies. The armed activities may also relate to large logging and palm oil operations there, threatening the customary land and resources of local indigenous communities. Security forces responded by sending troops to these areas, raising fears that the conflict is no longer confined to the highlands.
The Indonesian government’s public stance remained uncompromising, insisting that the West Papua issue is a matter of public security and law enforcement against “armed criminal groups” (Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata, or KKB) committing acts of terrorism. President Prabowo kept pushing economic development in West Papua, taking no steps towards peaceful dialogue. At the same time, Papuans ran public protests calling for dialogue and withdrawal of troops. In late October and early November 2025, demonstrations took place in Nabire, Enarotali, Sugapa, and Jayapura with people demanding an end to military operations and calling for a political dialogue to address the root causes of conflict. These protests indicate a growing civil society impatience with Jakarta’s security-based approach. The government largely ignored these appeals.
Internal displacement
The armed conflict and security operations have caused massive internal displacement, reaching unprecedented levels by the end of 2025. As noted, over 105,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have fled their homes across West Papua, with most IDPs unwilling to return due to heavily militarised zones or ongoing armed clashes. This is a steep increase from an estimated 85,000 IDPs in 2024. This trajectory highlights that the conflict’s intensity is not stagnant but is actively accelerating, displacing thousands of additional civilians each quarter.
The IDPs are overwhelmingly indigenous Papuans. Displacement incidents occurred in at least 10 regencies during 2025, with hotbed areas including Mimika, Intan Jaya, Nduga, Lanny Jaya, Yahukimo, and Puncak. Major displacement waves occurred after security forces conducted ground and aerial operations in indigenous communities. These patterns repeated across the central highlands, where entire communities have abandoned their villages due to ongoing outbreaks of armed violence.
The living conditions of IDPs in West Papua remained dire and deteriorated further in 2025. IDPs typically find refuge in temporary forest camps, church compounds, or live in overcrowded rental houses in safe urban areas. Most lack adequate shelter, clean water, food, sanitation, and healthcare. Those hiding in the jungle face extreme hardship. Exposure to the harsh weather, malnutrition, and disease are common. HRM documented that dozens of displaced Papuans have died over the past few years due to illness and deprivation in forest camps. Overcrowding is another issue in more accessible IDP sites. In towns like Wamena, Sorong, Nabire, and Timika, human rights defenders say that shelters are packed beyond capacity with displaced families sharing scant resources.
The government’s support for IDPs has been minimal. Local regents and church groups occasionally provided food or small aid, but there is no sustained relief program in place. Humanitarian access to conflict zones remained restricted by security forces, who view outside assistance with suspicion or block it, citing security concerns. As a result, IDP communities continued facing malnutrition, malaria, and other preventable diseases.
A worrying aspect of West Papua’s displacement crisis is its protracted nature. Many IDPs have been unable to return home for years, indicating an entrenched conflict. Over 10,000 Nduga villagers who fled military operations in 2018–2019 are still displaced in towns like Wamena, Jayapura, and Timika. Likewise, thousands from Puncak and Intan Jaya (displaced in 2021 and 2022) remain in limbo. Data on IDPs (table 3 below) shows that some displacement situations already date back seven years, with no resolution in sight. Many IDPs refuse to return until troops withdraw from their villages, but the military presence has only grown. This protracted displacement has created ghost villages in parts of West Papua. Fields are overgrown, and schools and churches are empty because the entire population has left.
Table 3: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) across West Papua – as of Dec 2025
| Regency / Area (major displacement events) | No. of IDPs | Displaced since: | Additional info / Origin of IDPs |
| Nduga (multiple districts) | 58,981 | 4 Dec. 2018 | IDPs from 11 districts of Nduga; 615+ IDPs have died during displacement (as of 2022). New displacements in Yuguru (Jan 2025). |
| Puncak (Ilaga, etc., 2018–2021 sec. ops) | 2,724 / +3,000 | 17 Dec. 2018 / Jun 2024 | Long-term Ilaga IDPs in Ilaga town; +3,000 fled Agandugume & Oneri districts after drought & conflict in Jun 2024. |
| Intan Jaya (central highlands) | 12,859 | Mar. 2020 – Mar. 2021 | IDPs from multiple Intan Jaya villages. 126 IDPs with serious health issues; at least 11 died in displacement. New waves in 2025 (Hitadipa, Sugapa). |
| Maybrat (Aifat districts, West Papua) | ~2,800 | 2 Sep. 2021 | IDPs from East Aifat (905 ppl) & South Aifat (920 ppl) still displaced. 138 IDPs died since 2021. Military posts occupy villages. |
| Pegunungan Bintang – Kiwirok District | ~752 | 10 Oct. 2021 | Some 200 fled to PNG; 96 IDPs died in camps as of Apr 2025. Fighting around Oksibil hindered return. |
| Yahukimo – Suru-Suru District | >800 | 20 Nov. 2021 | IDPs from 13 villages; scattered in 15 sites. 13 IDPs died, 16 babies born in camps with no medical care. |
| Yahukimo – Dekai District (Gunung area) | 554 / +83 | Aug. 2023 / Nov. 2025 | 554 IDPs from 2023 conflict (13 sick, 1 died). +83 fled Nov 2025 security operation in Jalan Gunung; 2 died during displacement. |
| Pegunungan Bintang – Oksop District | 4,584 | 8 Dec. 2024 | IDPs from 5 villages (Oksop etc.). 8 died in camps Dec 2024–Jun 2025. Some returns in mid-2025. |
| Nduga – Kroptak District | ~2,000 | 7 Dec. 2024 | First count included 65 toddlers, 8 pregnant women, 5 very ill, 15 elderly. Humanitarian needs acute. |
| Teluk Bintuni – Moskona Barat (West Papua) | N/A (hundreds) | 15 Jan. 2025 | Villagers (one woman died while fleeing) displaced by security sweep against separatists. |
| Nduga – Mebarok District | N/A | 18 Jan. 2025 | Residents of ≥9 villages hiding in forests after military raid. No count available. |
| Puncak – Sinak, Pogoma, Kembru, Bina Districts | >2,000 | 12 Feb. 2025 | IDPs from 4 districts (Pogoma, Sinak, etc.) took refuge around Sinak Town. |
| Yahukimo – Angguruk & Hereapini (highlands) | N/A | 24 Mar. 2025 | Hundreds displaced by clashes; no official count. Very remote area. |
| Yahukimo – Seradala (Dal District) | 71 | 11 Apr. 2025 | Small group (13 women, 19 youths, etc.) displaced after April skirmishes. |
| Jayawijaya – Maima District | N/A | 9 Jun. 2025 | Displacement reported after a security incident; details scant. |
| Intan Jaya – Hitadipa, Sugapa, Agisiga (2024–25) | 6,375 | Mar. & Jun. 2025 | IDPs from 7 villages (Bulapa, Hitadipa, etc.). ~900 returned briefly in Jun 2025, but many displaced again after new violence. |
| Puncak – multiple districts (2021–2025 ops) | “hundreds” | May–June 2025 | Hundreds displaced in Gome (May 2025) and Yugumuak, Omukia (June 2025) due to raids. Houses burned by TNI in some villages. |
| Puncak Jaya – Lumo | N/A | 11 Aug. 2025 | Villagers fled after troops burned homes in Lumo (Aug 2025). Population unknown. |
| Intan Jaya – Sugapa District (Aug 2025) | >1,000 | 16 Aug. 2025 | IDPs from 6 villages (Eknemba, etc.) around Sugapa Town. Fled after heavy fighting; many now in Nabire. |
| Yahukimo – Sumo District | 1,890 | 15 Aug. 2025 | Entire district displaced by conflict in Kwelamdua area. IDPs scattered; count by church groups. |
| Intan Jaya – Hitadipa District (Sep–Oct 2025) | >145 | 11 Sep. – 15 Oct. 2025 | IDPs from 8 villages (Bulapa, Yoparu, etc.) due to new TNI posts and clashes. |
| Teluk Bintuni – Moskona Utara (West Papua) | 238 | 18 Oct. 2025 | Villagers from 5 settlements (e.g., Moyeba) fled amid joint police-military operation. |
| Lanny Jaya – Melagi District | ~2,300 | 5 Oct. 2025 | IDPs from Wunabugu village and surrounds after Oct aerial attack during church service. |
| Yahukimo – Dekai (Jalan Gunung area) (Nov 2025) | 222 | 31 Oct. 2025 | Villagers (Domon 1 & 2) displaced by military order & subsequent clashes in Dekai. Some fatalities (see above). |
| Mimika – Jila District (Oct–Dec 2025) | >1,700 | 31 Oct. & 10 Dec. 2025 | IDPs from Jila after Oct ground raid (~1,500) and Dec aerial bombings (hundreds more). Many in forests; some reached Timika. |
| Yahukimo – Dekai (Gunung area, Nov 2025) | 83 | 12 Nov. 2025 | Displacement from Jalan Gunung (Dekai) following Nov operation; at least 2 deaths during flight. |
| Intan Jaya – Sugapa (Nov 2025) | “hundreds” | 7 Nov. 2025 | New displacement after Nov 7 Sugapa raid; included women/children injured. |
| TOTAL IDPs (West Papua) | >105,878 | (as of 1 Jan. 2026) | Most IDPs are indigenous Papuans. Many refuse to return home until military operations cease |
Sources: Data compiled by HRM from local church networks, human rights defenders, and media. Note: “N/A” indicates data not available or not formally counted. Bolded regencies are those with the largest displaced populations. The total >105,878 includes both protracted and newly displaced persons as of Jan 2026.
The long-term emergency has prompted calls for a humanitarian response. In late 2025, the Papuan Church Council organised a “Literacy and Resilience Festival” where IDPs narrated their stories, aiming to document the crisis and demand that authorities act. Despite calls for intervention, the national government refuses to acknowledge the full scale of internal displacement in West Papua, preventing national and international humanitarian agencies from assisting.
The Indonesian government has not launched any significant relief operation or conflict-resolution initiative for IDPs in West Papua as of 2025. Most official statements either downplay the numbers or blame the TPNPB for causing civilian displacements. This lack of acknowledgement prompted stronger domestic and international calls for action. In June 2025, a forum of Papuan representatives in Jakarta (For Papua MPR/DPR) urged the government to abandon its security approach, explicitly citing the worsening displacement and humanitarian suffering as evidence that military solutions are failing. Humanitarian organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), have no access to many areas due to Indonesian restrictions. The continued state-negligence of IDPs in West Papua stands as one of the gravest human rights and humanitarian crises in Indonesia today, demanding urgent national and international attention.
Military officials have reportedly pressured residents to convince IDPs to return from the forests, explicitly stating their desire to eliminate “reports of IDPs”. This suggests a state-level attempt to obscure the humanitarian crisis rather than address its root causes. Furthermore, health access for the displaced has been compromised, as IDPs fear seeking medical care at public hospitals due to military presence and surveillance.
Despite the hardships, there were small glimmers of hope as some IDP groups managed partial returns under improved security. In mid-2025, approximately 900 IDPs from Intan Jaya who had fled earlier in the year returned to their villages after local officials negotiated a pause in fighting. However, many of those returnees were displaced again months later when clashes resumed, underscoring how fragile the situation is. In Nduga, a few hundred villagers from Gearek District returned to their villages by Christmas 2025 after being displaced for more than two weeks. TNI operations reportedly continued, leaving the local population afraid of further raids. Given the persistent stagnation in the peace process, large-scale returns are unlikely to occur soon. Instead, humanitarian groups are focusing on harm reduction, providing schooling for displaced kids, mobile clinics for IDP sites, and documenting human rights abuses to advocate for change.
The end of 2025 leaves West Papua at a precarious juncture. Without a change in approach, the armed conflict and internal displacement crisis could further escalate in 2026. Meaningful steps toward dialogue and humanitarian access could begin to alleviate the suffering. The trajectory will depend on decisions made by the Indonesian government and the resilience of West Papua’s civil society in the face of ongoing hardship.
Recommendations:
The Indonesian government should promote transparency and public oversight of the implementation of laws that are to prevent extra-judicial killings, torture, violations of freedom of expression and other freedoms by prioritising a no-cover-up policy in the rule of law institutions. This oversight and transparency require at least:
- A zero tolerance for intimidation of journalists and other human rights defenders. Any form of oppression of media work or that of civil society should be responded to in all cases with effective law enforcement and judicial measures against the perpetrators, particularly in cases where perpetrators are part of state institutions or state forces.
- Full open access to the conflict region for foreign journalists and international human rights workers, dropping any restrictions, surveillance and blocking of access for these actors
- A standing invitation to all special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
- Provision of full access to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to West Papua
To address the crises of displacement and conflict violence, the Indonesian government should:
- Declare a state of humanitarian crisis for the Papuan provinces, allowing national and international humanitarian actors to provide the full needed support for IDPs
- Cooperate with international peace-building mechanisms of the UN and international civil society to address the conflict between military-supported resource extraction and military deployments on the one hand and the resistance to such activities by indigenous armed groups. The government should open itself up to non-armed dialogue with ALL relevant conflict actors and seek a de-escalation of violence rather than an expansion of extraction and military presence.
These measures should be able to contribute considerably to an environment in which culturally adequate and well-resourced and reliable health care and education can be provided to indigenous communities, particularly to indigenous children, who otherwise grow up in an environment of armed violence between the state and their communities and a lack of opportunities for personal development as well as for development-oriented indigenous community organisation.
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