Since President Prabowo Subianto assumed office, concerns have surged regarding Indonesia’s accelerating militarisation, particularly with the expanding occupation of civilian government positions by active members of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). Prabowo started his new presidential term by taking his cabinet to a military bootcamp retreat in October 2024 (see photo on top, screeshot). This trend poses significant threats to Indonesia’s young democracy, highlighting a troubling revival of authoritarian tendencies reminiscent of the New Order Regime under former president Soeharto.
On 10 March 2025, TNI Commander General Agus Subiyanto disclosed a list of government institutions legally authorised to appoint active-duty TNI soldiers to civilian posts, based on Article 47 of Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI. These agencies include key strategic institutions such as the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Presidential Military Secretariat, State Intelligence Agency (BIN), National Cyber and Cipher Agency (BSSN), National Defense Organisation (Lemhannas & Wanhannas), National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), National Narcotics Agency (BNN), and even the Supreme Court.
This official acknowledgment coincides alarmingly with the recent revelation by senior researcher Al Araf from the Indonesian human rights organisation ‘Imparsial’, who highlighted that approximately 2,500 active TNI soldiers currently occupy civilian positions in direct violation of the same TNI Law. Al Araf underlined the seriousness of these infringements, citing the controversial appointment of Major Teddy Indra Wijaya as Cabinet Secretary—later adjusted to Deputy Cabinet Secretary—as indicative of the deeper, systemic undermining of civilian bureaucracy and meritocracy.
The progressing militarisation under President Prabowo aligns with worrying legislative efforts to amend the TNI Law, ostensibly to remove restrictions on soldiers engaging in business activities. Many civil society watchdogs fear that the amendment is merely a pretext benefiting high-ranking officers seeking personal enrichment through business ventures, echoing practices prevalent during the authoritarian New Order era.
Simultaneously, Indonesia’s democracy is experiencing a measurable decline. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) 2024 Democracy Index downgraded Indonesia to 59th place, attributing the regression notably to Prabowo’s presidency and his association with former President Joko Widodo, whose political maneuvers have intensified concerns about power centralisation and diminished democratic oversight.
The erosion of democratic safeguards through the legitimisation of military intrusion into civilian governance threatens Indonesia’s democracy, jeopardises the integrity of civilian administration, weakens accountability, and reintroduces authoritarian risks. The achievements of the Reformation era are at stake. More than ever, civil society and democratic institutions in Indonesia have the heavy responsibility to remain vigilant and advocate for adherence to democratic principles, civilian supremacy, and accountability under national and international human rights standards.
